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### LATIN WORD-ORDER IN ITS RELATIONS TO EMPHASIS

Professor John Greene's article upon this subject in Volume II, Numbers 1 and 2, of THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY is welcome as an effort to clarify a much muddled matter, but certain misconceptions of his in connection with the Greenough theory call for animadversion. As these misconceptions are perhaps due in part to inadequacies or infelicities of expression in Greenough's exposition of his theory and in my treatment of it in the new Andrews and Stoddard, it seems appropriate, now that Greenough is no longer with us, that I should try to correct them.

Why does Cicero begin § 32 of the Cato Maior with the order, *Sed redeo ad me*, and at the beginning of § 45 say, *Ad me ipsum iam revertar*? Is it accident? Is it for mere variety? Are there any considerations of rhythm, euphony, perspicuity, that could have influenced him? Is it not simply because in the first instance the speaker is thinking more especially of the digression he has been making from the account of his own experiences, and so says, 'But I *come back* to myself', while in the second he is thinking more of himself as distinguished from other people, so that he says, 'I will now turn back to myself'? And why does Livy (1. 6), in speaking of the dispute between Romulus and Remus about the sovereignty of Rome, say, *Quoniam gemini essent nec aetatis verecundia discrimen facere posset*, etc., while in Chapter 3, when speaking of the usurpation by Amulius of the crown that belonged to his brother Numitor, he says, *Plus tamen vis potuit quam voluntas patris aut verecundia aetatis*? I hold that it is because there is a slight difference in his thought as represented by the words *verecundia* and *aetatis* in the two cases, such that we may translate the first by 'Since they were twins, and the respect due seniority could make no distinction', and the second by 'Force, however, had more weight than their father's wish or the respect due seniority'.

We call the words emphatic which in written English we underline thus in a phrase or sentence, and in speaking we utter them more forcibly to indicate that they are more important in the thought than the other words. All scholars recognize, I think, that in Latin such words are often placed before the others in a phrase or sentence. The Greenough theory is that this is always done, and to understand the bearings of the theory we must remember that there are other kinds of importance in some words over others, and must have a clear idea of the kind of importance referred to when we call a word emphatic. The importance illustrated above is given by the speaker to one word or another for the time being according as he desires to call more special attention to one aspect or an-

other of a thought. Another kind of importance is inherent in the meaning of some words itself, is therefore always present and is quite independent of the will of the speaker. The first is the kind called emphasis in the Greenough theory and in the general usage, I think, of Latin Grammars, although, unfortunately, this word is sometimes loosely used to include the other kind, which has no specific term of its own. The confusion is partly caused by the fact that though we do not usually underline an inherently important word in writing, we do in speaking utter it more forcibly. This forcible utterance or stress, however, is given a different character in the two cases by different inflections of the voice unless, as sometimes happens, the inherently important word is also emphatic in a given instance.

A conspicuous manifestation of inherent importance is what we call a climax. The order of the words in a climax is a matter of rhetoric, having to do with the arrangement in connected discourse of those aggregates of words to which we give the names 'paragraph', 'sentence', 'coordinate clause', and it must not be forgotten that such aggregates of words are grammatically independent of each other. So far as the other kind of importance, or emphasis in the stricter sense, affects the order of words, it has to do with their arrangement within their own syntactically combined groups—their own phrases, clauses, or sentences. It is necessary to insist upon these distinctions, because Professor Greene ignores them, and thus does an injustice to the Greenough theory when he says, "if (that theory) is correct, the Romans must have avoided the climax altogether". The words in such a series as *veni, vidi, vici*, or *abiit, excessit, evasit, erupit*, do not form a sentence according to the spirit of the term, whatever may be said of the letter, and their sequence is not in conflict with the Greenough theory any more than is the sequence of the major and minor premises and the conclusion in a syllogism. Examples like *persuasumst homini, factumst; ventumst, vincimur; duxit, and Loquarne? incendam; taceam? instigem; purgem me? laterem lavem*, belong, *mutatis mutandis*, in the same category. The only thing here that falls within the province of the Greenough theory is the position of the two words relatively to each other in the groups *persuasumst homini, purgem me, laterem lavem*, respectively. It may be said in passing that beyond this, the sequence of the parts in cases like these examples never gives the pupil any trouble either in reading the Latin authors or in trying to write Latin on his own account.

Again, Professor Greene says, "according to the (Greenough) theory, any word beginning a sentence is *ipso facto* the most emphatic word in it; the second word is next in emphasis, and so on. Hence,

to avoid distortion of emphasis, and therefore of meaning, the most emphatic word must be sought out and placed first, without regard to connection, perspicuity, or euphony". Further on he accuses the theory of making the single word the unit of expression, and develops the accusation in a grotesquely distorted fashion. Even if the words quoted from Greenough's Grammar and from mine may, when thus isolated, seem to give color to this charge of regarding a sentence in the light of the school boy notion that when one is to be formed, its words are lying about somewhere ready made, and have only to be picked up and strung together, or as a chain of single words that must each "occupy its proper place in a graduated scale of emphasis ranging from the maximum on the first word to the minimum on the last", no such absurdity can, I think, fairly be inferred from the general drift of our language. Only in the simplest phrases, of course, are single words as such the units. When a clause or a sentence, as usually happens, contains some words grouped in phrases and other words not so grouped, the phrases as wholes count as units in the clause, and the phrases and clauses count as units in the sentence, upon the same footing as the single words not grouped in phrases or clauses. And even so, not all the parts of speech have the same rank as units in a grammatical combination. Connectives, the copula, unemphatic pronouns, prepositions, and the like, form proclitically or enclitically a part of the more solid part of speech before them, or after them, and have as a rule no independence as units in the sentence on a par with the nouns, verbs, adjectives, and many classes of adverbs.

Professor Greene thinks that the considerations of euphony and rhythm spoken of by Cicero and Quintilian are impossible of fulfilment by words whose position is regulated by emphasis according to the Greenough theory. This seems to apply especially to the end of a sentence, and Professor Greene criticises somewhat sharply my remark that "it was a Roman habit of thought to put the least emphatic part of a statement into verb form". He says, "the Latin verb, on the contrary, had a power of condensed and weighty expression . . . unknown to most modern languages". So the Latin verb and other Latin words had a rich and smooth rotundity of sound and a euphoniousness, derived from their length combined with avoidance of harsh consonants, quite beyond the common run of English words, and this made it very easy for a Roman to pay special attention to the rhythm of his sentence without reversing any logical emphasis. But a word may be filled to the brim with power of condensed and weighty expression, which gives it inherent importance, without on that account having

special emphasis in a given phrase or sentence. It is especially hard for many people to keep the distinction clear as applied to the last word of a Latin sentence, because in English we are apt to emphasize the last word, and in reading Latin to one's self it is not easy to keep in mind the difference in the quality of the forcible utterance we give to strong emphasis in speaking and that which we give to a word of great inherent importance.

Professor Greene asks, "How could the Romans have been satisfied to speak or write with the emphasis always falling in the same places? For ourselves we claim the privilege of emphasizing almost any word in any part of a sentence, long or short. Is it not quite inconceivable that the Romans were inhibited . . . from doing exactly the same thing? If any one doubts, let him consider the fact that *ne* . . . *quidem* with an emphatic word or phrase between may stand in any part of a sentence from the very beginning to the very end".

The fact that *ne* . . . *quidem* with an emphatic word or phrase between may stand anywhere in a sentence does not militate against the Greenough theory, unless it be assumed that emphasis is a fixed quantity, so that every emphatic word is just as emphatic as every other. That theory, like any other, recognizes that words like *quidem*, *etiam*, etc., are often used to give emphasis to another word, and only maintains that they do not thus impart an emphasis higher in degree than the emphases earlier in the sentence. Nor does the theory require the monotony in emphasis which Professor Greene's question would imply. Not only in Latin, as he gracefully puts it in his poetical peroration, but in other languages, a well made sentence is "a succession of eminences, severed not by impassable gorges, but by gentle and agreeable depressions". This figure, however, applies rather to the sound than to the sense, and the "depressions" are represented by the unaccented syllables of the longer words quite as much as by the unemphatic words, especially in Latin. Nor is the "eminence" of an emphasized monosyllable the same as that of a polysyllable. Greenough used to characterize a Latin sentence as a picture the perspective of which could be properly appreciated only by standing directly in front of it.

In written language, though we mark some of the relations of emphasis by mechanical devices, we cannot, if the language is, like most of Cicero's and much other classical Latin, highly rhetorical, mark them all thus, because they are not only too many but also often too subtle for an instrument of such limited scope. Even in English of cultivated style we try to obviate the difficulty somewhat by the collocation of the words, but this is possible only to a very slight extent with us, while Latin, because

of its richness in inflectional endings, offers a wide field for such an expedient. We Greenoughites believe that the Romans utilized this expedient most thoroughly, placing always the unit which was more important in its own little grammatical combination before that which was less so, and we believe this, because their Latin read in accordance with that principle seems to us to disclose the thought it contains, with all its rhetorical as well as logical variations, more easily and smoothly than when read in any other way.

Let any one who can understand Latin without having to translate it in his mind read a passage of Cicero—the twenty-first chapter of the Laelius, for instance—marking the alternations of emphasis in accordance with the Greenough theory. Let him remember that connectives, prepositions, and the like are not distinct entities, but rather semi-detached fragments of the word next after or next before them (unless, indeed, the connective or prepositional idea is to be made specially emphatic, as when we say, ‘not *to* but *from* New York’, or ‘both Washington *and* Boston’). Such reading will probably enable him to see how completely this Latin complies with our rule, even if it be a mere coincidence. The advocates of the Greenough theory believe that it is not a coincidence, and that the theory has a great practical value, even though they may not accept the whole of Greenough’s development of it. I was very glad to hear one of my old colleagues at Harvard say to me in Cambridge the other day, “I teach it, because it makes my men write better Latin”.

It is on account of this practical value of the theory as a working hypothesis, so to speak, that I am so sorry to find Professor Greene basing his teachings as to order first and foremost upon the old doctrine of the ‘normal sentence’. If it appears too revolutionary to omit that doctrine altogether, I would at least have it relegated, as is often done now-a-days, to a distinctly subordinate position. For it not only makes the pupil’s Latin more wooden and mechanical than it is apt to be by nature, but is itself responsible for certain stumbling blocks that ought not to be there. For instance, it implies that there is some occult difference of emphasis on the first word in Caesar *id nuntiatum esset*, *eos per provinciam nostram iter facere conari*, *maturat ab urbe proficisci*, etc. (B. G. I. 7), and Caesar *iis*, *quos in castris retinuerat*, *discedendi potestatem fecit* (B. G. 4. 15), because forsooth, *Caesari* is a dative and *Caesar* is a subject-nominative! Does it help matters to call one a rhetorical, the other a grammatical arrangement?

Professor Greene develops his system in seven paragraphs. Paragraph (4), that “an unusual position calls attention to the word so placed”, seems

to be a corollary of an elaborately developed normal sentence. An advocate of the Greenough theory feels inclined to ask “Just what constitutes an ‘unusual’ position for a word in a Latin sentence”? Does this paragraph (4) mean that the subject becomes emphatic by being placed in the middle of the sentence? And does it make “the copula, the imperative, and verbs that are neither energetic or sonorous” emphatic if placed at the end of the sentence, since usually, according to paragraph (2), they “recede from the end”?

Paragraph (3) begins with a pronouncement that “the beginning of a sentence is not *per se* an emphatic position”. As instances are given *video*, the first word of the Fourth Catilinian oration, and *credo*, the first word of the Roscius. Now when we say that these words are emphatic, we do not mean that they are to be uttered with a “trumpet blast” inconsistent with what Professor Greene considers the appropriate serenity with which to begin every exordium, any more than, when we say that the last word of a sentence is the least emphatic, we mean that it is to be slighted in utterance, as the failure to maintain a measured difference between long and short syllables makes customary in the unaccented parts of much spoken English. What we mean is that there is a difference in the presentation of the thought according as one sequence or another is adopted for the members of a phrase or clause or sentence, and that this difference is more like what is commonly called emphasis than it is like any other kind of importance, though in degree it may be too delicate to be expressed by emphatically forcible utterance, and have to be mentally felt to be appreciated. In the two cases before us *credo* can be distinctly felt to be several shades nearer ordinary emphasis than *video*. I am willing to admit that ‘emphasis’ is not a wholly adequate word here, and shall be grateful to any one who supplies a better.

But the part of the Greenough theory that troubles many people most is its corollary that the last place in a sentence never has emphasis, or, as perhaps better put, has least emphasis. None of the examples I have ever seen quoted in support of the contrary seems to me to give any real evidence of it. The emphasis claimed for them appears to me in all cases to be a misconception of the emphasis intended by the writer. Some emphases follow so naturally from the smooth and logical development of the thought that even in a written sentence we easily recognize them without needing to have them indicated by mechanical means. Very often, however, emphasis depends upon the will of the speaker. Persons of different habits of thought will choose different emphases out of those admissible in a given case. It requires effort to adapt your point of view to that of a mind that works differently from your

own, and nothing is more common than to make mistakes in emphasis when reading English aloud at sight. In Latin, as in English, we have certain helps, such as *quidem* and *etiam*, already mentioned, to say nothing of chiasmus and anaphora. But how are we to tell, when the writer gives no such sign? How do the opponents of the Greenough theory know in all cases what emphasis was intended? Too often, it seems to me, they follow their own inner consciousness as influenced by English usage, or get an inspiration from heaven or elsewhere, as our pupils do when they decide first what Caesar or Cicero ought to have said, and then twist the Latin words into seeming to mean it.

Apart from any theory of order, I find one insurmountable obstacle to believing that the last place in a Latin sentence or phrase ever has emphasis in the sense of being occupied by a word more emphatic than the preceding words. This obstacle is that there is always for the emphasis claimed a different order against which nothing can be brought on the score of euphony, rhythm, perspicuity, or anything else, and there are in the Classics numerous examples of the two orders with practically the same words. This can hardly be accidental, and I find no better explanation of it than that offered by the Greenough theory. The different ways in which different minds work, however, make it very difficult to give convincing reasons in short compass for adopting a particular emphasis in cases where the doctors disagree.

A somewhat plausible case is made out from the sentence in Cicero's Murena, Saltatorem appellat L. Murenam Cato, but it seems to me to be based on quite irrelevant reasoning. The fact that Cato was not a nobody but an influential and dreaded opponent has nothing to do with the question whether his name is emphatic here or not. The sentence is not an isolated sentence, shot into the air like a skyrocket, but part of an elaborate speech, and to determine its emphasis one must look at the development of the argument of that speech. Cicero had answered both the complaint of Sulpicius and the accusation of Cato against him for defending Murena. Then, turning to the charges against Murena, he had divided them into three classes, those of the first class dealing with his mode of life. This was one of these. Cicero was thinking of Cato here merely as that one of the prosecutors who had preferred the charge, and his rebuttal of it goes to show that "the serious part of the matter" was not so much that Cato brought the charge as that it was a trumped up charge, unworthy of a man like him and made to appear especially heinous by the use of a Billingsgate term of reproach. Any added weight it had through coming from Cato is sufficiently indicated by the simple mention of his name, and

the translation, 'Cato calls Lucius Murena a *vaudeville dancer*', expresses all the emphasis it is necessary to mark in the sentence. Sentences ending thus with a proper name are particularly liable to cause misconception of emphasis through the inherent importance proper names derive from their very individuality. Let us consider in connection with this the passage in the Milo (34), from which Professor Greene quotes another of his examples. Cicero says, Quid Milonis intererat interfici Clodium? Quid erat cur Milo non dicam admitteret, sed optaret? Obstabat in spe consulatus Miloni Clodius. At eo repugnante fiebat, immo vero eo fiebat magis, nec me suffragatore meliore utebatur quam Clodio. I should paraphrase the passage in some such way as this: 'How did it concern MILO that Clodius should *be killed*? What reason was there why MILO, I will not say, should *do* the deed but should *desire* it? Clodius, you will say, was a STUMBLING BLOCK in Milo's way in the *hope* he had of being made consul. But he *was* made consul IN SPITE OF HIS ANTAGONISM, or rather, he was *made* consul all the more BECAUSE of it, and did not find even in ME one who gave him better *support* than Clodius'. I wonder whether Professor Greene would make the name of Clodius emphatic in the three sentences in which it stands at the end here. That would seem to me nearly as reasonable as to emphasize Cato in the previous example. He does make the first *fiebat* emphatic and *magis* still more so, and I have no extraneous reason with which to controvert his position, so thoroughly is the emphasis here dependent on the choice of the speaker, except the general one hinted at before, that I believe if Cicero had meant that, he would have said, At fiebat eo repugnante, immo vero magis eo fiebat. Such a passage resembles piano playing with the loud pedal kept on through whole bars. Though some parts of the music are lighter than others, they all have more volume than moderately *forte* notes without the pedal. So here all the words are loaded with meaning, with emphasis, if you will, and the question is which words are the *most* emphatic. The Greenough theory marks certain ones upon a consistent principle; the champions of final emphasis for various reasons mark different ones. Who shall decide?

Sometimes a shade of emphasis is so subtle that to be brought out in English it demands quite a change in the grammatical structure of the expression. In the clause from Livy (1. 7), Postquam facinus facinorisque causam audivit, the thought seems to me better represented in English by 'After he heard about the *deed* and why he *did* the deed' than by Professor Greene's 'the daring deed and the *reason* for it'. If the genitive is "so devoid of

emphasis that we naturally represent it by the pronoun 'it', why did not Livy use *eius*?

Again, Cicero (De Imp. Pomp. 16), says, *Nisi eos qui vobis fructui sunt conservarit non solum, ut ante dixi, calamitate, sed etiam calamitatis formidine liberatos*. Professor Greene thinks it is "inconceivable that an orator in any language would emphasize like this: not only from *disaster*, but also from the dread of *DISASTER*". How about 'not only from *disaster*, but also from the dread of *disaster*', which is the emphasis suggested by the Greenough theory? This emphasizes not so much the meaning of the word *calamitatis* as the relation involved in its case. Cicero had shortly before said, *Itaque haec vobis provincia . . . non modo a calamitate, sed etiam a metu calamitatis est defendenda*. Can we suppose that anything in the studied utterances of so consummate a master of rhetoric was without a purpose, and is not such a subtle nuance quite worthy of him?

Also in the case from the Laelius (82), *Nam maximum ornamentum amicitiae tollit, qui ex ea tollit verecundiam*, I "hold the opposite view", even at the risk of its being "as absurd as it would be for a player to deliver Hamlet's line thus—'If thou wilt needs marry, MARRY a fool'". Parallels between English and Latin are ticklish things, and I venture to think that, far from its being "clear that the first *tollit* is more emphatic than the second", there is no relation of emphasis between them. As to the emphasis claimed for *verecundiam*, I would remark that the previous sentence is, *Neque solum colent inter se ac diligunt, sed etiam verebuntur*, in which Professor Greene presumably makes *verebuntur* emphatic as a climactic word. Is *verecundiam*, then, a case of that flat and wellnigh "inconceivable" repetition of an emphasis so castigated in *calamitatisque formidine*? I hold, of course, that the first sentence has no relations of emphasis "within the meaning of the law" (except between *colent* and *inter se*), and that the second sentence means 'For he takes from friendship its VERY GREATEST *adornment* who leaves reverence out of it'.

I have selected these examples because they seem to me the most slippery and likely to give the most trouble to the inexperienced student. It would require too much space and weary the reader over much to analyse all of Professor Greene's examples. I will therefore close with a brief treatment of one more in which there seems to me a logical reason in the situation itself for an emphasis different from that marked by Professor Greene. In the De Deorum Natura (1. 17), Cicero writes, *Ut hic qui intervenit (me intuens) ne ignoret quae res agatur, de natura agebamus deorum*. Professor Greene makes *deorum* emphatic. Why? He does not tell us. The speakers here are not discussing the ques-

tion of the existence or non-existence of gods, or taking the gods as a general subject of discussion, as one might take football, for instance. They are talking about their nature. Hence I should make *natura* rather than *deorum* emphatic, not explosively emphatic, but gently emphatic. The case is also interesting as an example of the rhythmical effect which the Roman sometimes gave to the end of a sentence by inserting an outside word between the two words of a phrase. It will be noticed that this does not injure the emphases. It should also be noticed that what we may call the natural utterance of the English expression, 'the nature of the gods', tends to befog the emphasis here through its propensity to stress the last word, while the possessive sign makes the plural, 'the gods' *nature*', very awkward. In the singular, 'God's *nature*', neither difficulty appears.

HENRY PREBLE

## REVIEW

The Attica of Pausanias. Edited with Introduction, Notes, Plans and Excursuses, by Mitchell Carroll. Boston: Ginn & Co. (1908). Pp. vii + 293. Mailing Price, \$1.75.

Interest in archaeology has increased very widely in the last few years and now most college students of Greek get from their instructors some notion of Greece itself and its monuments. Hence it is a pleasure to know that Ginn and Co. have added to their College Series an edition of the first book of Pausanias, the Attica entire, dedicated appropriately to the late president of the Archaeological Institute, Professor Seymour. Pausanias is the archaeologist's Baedeker and the main interest in him is antiquarian, yet there is enough of the historical and mythological as well as of the archaeological to make his work more than a mere guide-book. The charm which characterizes the writings of Herodotus, who had much influence on Pausanias, is not altogether lacking and college students could easily read the Attica. It will do no harm to read a little second century Greek along with Herodotus and the other classical authors. In connection with such a course the instructor should lecture on the monuments and history of Athens and, where it is possible, use the stereopticon or photographs of the ancient monuments in Athens. This will be necessary because in Professor Carroll's edition there is a sad lack of plans, maps and photographic illustrations. There are only five figures, one of the Athenian Agora (p. 236), plans of the Theatre of Dionysus (p. 260), of the Propylaea (p. 272), of the foundations of the Parthenon (p. 277) and Dörpfeld's new plan of the Erechtheum and Old Temple of Athena (p. 281).

This edition appears very opportunely just after the